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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 12-1692
________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SHAMAR LANELL BANKS,
Appellant
________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1-11-cr-00002-001)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 1, 2012

Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO, and BARRY, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 4, 2013)
________________
OPINION
________________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge

Shamar Lanell Banks pled guilty to distribution and possession with intent to
distribute cocaine base and hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was
sentenced to 198 months’ imprisonment, and now appeals his sentence. We affirm.
In July of 2010, York, Pennsylvania police coordinated a controlled drug purchase
between Banks and an unidentified cooperating source. The purchase was to take place
near McKinley Elementary School on the corner of Manor and Kurtz Streets in York.
Banks arrived by car at approximately 7:00 p.m. and pulled up next to the source, who
was seated in his own car on the designated corner. Banks chose to move the meeting
location south on Manor Street in the direction of Springettsbury Avenue and York
College.
While Banks was traveling to this new location, Detective Scott Nadzom and
Officer Hower believed Banks observed them in their unmarked vehicle. Detective
Nadzom advised assisting traffic units to stop and arrest Banks.
When Banks made a left-hand turn onto Springettsbury Avenue, multiple marked
and unmarked traffic units began their pursuit. Among those units was Sergeant John
Veater, who had both his lights and siren activated. Banks did not stop his car, proceeded
to drive at a rate of 40 to 50 miles-per-hour in a 25 mile-per-hour residential zone, and
failed to stop for five posted stop signs. The chase continued through at least eight
residential blocks, including those with limited visibility among row houses and bumperto-bumper parking lining both sides of the street. Banks then abandoned his car and fled
on foot. Indeed, he evaded arrest until October of 2010.
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In July of 2011, Banks pled guilty to distribution and possession with intent to
distribute cocaine base and hydrochloride. The District Court held a sentencing hearing
at which Banks contested the applicability of a two-level enhancement under United
States Sentencing Guideline § 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment while fleeing from the
police. Detective Nadzom and Sergeant Veater testified at that hearing in support of the
§ 3C1.2 enhancement. The District Court determined that the enhancement was
warranted. Banks appealed, and raises one issue: whether his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the District Court erred in applying the two-level enhancement
under § 3C1.2.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Banks asserts that the District Court committed a procedural error by applying a
two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2
because his actions would otherwise be considered minor traffic violations. Section
3C1.2 applies when “the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or
serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement
officer.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. A district court must find all facts by a preponderance of the
evidence. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 568 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). With
respect to the application of § 3C1.2, a district court must find that the defendant acted
recklessly and that the action created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.
Recklessness is defined “as a situation in which the defendant was aware of the risk
created by his conduct and the risk was of such a nature and degree that to disregard that
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risk constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
would exercise in such a situation.” U.S.S.G. §§ 3C1.2 cmt. n.2, 2A1.4 cmt. n.1.
Banks drove his car at twice the legal speed limit on a residential street and
disregarded posted stop signs. That neighborhood was in close proximity to an
elementary school, college, public park, and commercial district where pedestrian traffic
is common. The close quarters of the row houses that line the streets, and the bumper-tobumper parking on both sides of the road, limit sightlines and reduce awareness of
pedestrian presence. Although Banks did not strike or nearly strike bystanders or
vehicles, direct instances of harm are not relevant to a determination of a “substantial risk
of death or serious bodily injury.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 (emphasis added).
Speeding, running stop signs, and leading police in a pursuit through a residential
area created the risk and recklessness that the District Court found in applying § 3C1.2.
This is sufficient to warrant an enhancement. United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 96
(3d Cir. 1992). In this context, the District Court’s imposition of a two-level
enhancement under § 3C1.2 is hardly in error. We thus affirm Banks’s sentence.
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